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ABSTRACT
Theories oscal federalism, such as those propounded by Musgrave, Tiebout, and Brennan
and Buchanan, prescribe assignment of revenue sources among federal, state, and local
governments. In this article, we demonstrate that the recent diversication of municipal
revenue sources in response to devolutionary forces does not follow the expectations of the
scal federalism theories. Our analysis suggests that the use of an institutional approach to
the study oscal federalism would help to reduce the mismatch between theory and reality.
In an essay entitled ‘‘The New American Devolution: Problems and Prospects,’’ Max
Sawicky observes that ‘‘if we exclude Social Security, Medicare, net interest on the federal
debt, and defense from the total expenditures oederal, state, and local governments in the
United States, 80 percent of what remains is administered by state and local governments’’
(1999, 3). He goes on to proclaim, ‘‘Therefore, it can be said that the bulk of national
domestic policy is already decentralized or ‘devolved’’’ (1999, 5). Devolution, however,
did not stop at state capitals; a ‘‘second order’’ of devolution pushed responsibilities to the
lower rungs on the federal ladder. States have been forced to downsize, streamline, and
restructure (Cigler 1998, 63–64) and in the process have ‘‘often shifted burdens to local
governments without careful consideration whether this was the correct course’’ (Gold and
Wallin 1999, 73).
Devolution between the states and their subnational units of government has been
largely ignored in studies of contemporary intergovernmental relations (Nathan 1996;
Weber and Brace 1999). The theoretical rationale for the policy of devolution flows in part
from the logic of economic models oederalism. These models derive quite specific
prescriptions for the assignment ounctions and revenue sources to levels of government.
But the reality of ‘‘second-order’’ devolution runs counter to the predictions of the
economic models. This essay explores this paradox and suggests that institutional
approaches oer an alternative to the reigning theories of fiscal federalism. It does so by
examining recent shifts in the sources of municipal revenues. These empirical realities are
used to critically discuss the explanatory applicability of models of fiscal federalism to
devolution.
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The analysis begins with a brief account of devolution within the context of state–local
relations. This is followed by a survey of the principal models of fiscal federalism, with the
express purpose odentifying propositions that could be used to explain changes in local
revenue sources in the face of devolution. Next, the shifts in the revenue sources relied on by
municipal governments are profiled and compared with the predictions of existing theories.
Finally, the paradox between the widely held models of fiscal federalism and the changes in
municipal revenue sources is discussed. Because the economic models of fiscal federalism
yield a set onconsistent propositions as to how state–local relations would be altered by
devolution, the analysis concludes by suggesting the utility of an institutional approach.
CRITICAL TRENDS IN STATE–LOCAL RELATIONS
State–local relations are the nation’s oldest intergovernmental relationship (Walker 1995,
267). Thrust and counterthrust by the two tiers of government have continued unabated
since the colonial period, and it is no surprise that substantial change has occurred in the
nature and position of state and local governments (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001, 7–14).
The reform of state governments beginning in the 1970s was one of the most important
institutional transformations that aected state–local relations after World War II
(Bowman and Kearney 1986; Reeves 1982). The resulting institutional and structural
changes closed the gap in capacity and competence that had existed previously between
municipalities and states. But alterations in the state–local relationship did not stop at this
point. Weber and Brace assert that ‘‘over the past three decades, states and localities in the
United States have been changed dramatically in function and performance’’ (1999, 1). In
particular, they (1999, 2–16) identify important shifts in the larger context oederalism,
the finances of state and local governments, and increased opportunities for citizens to
participate in state and local policy processes. For the purpose of this analysis, it is useful to
focus on two specific aspects of these recent changes in state–local relations: (1) the larger
context oederalism, especially the movement toward devolution, and (2) the inter-
governmental structure of revenues.
Devolution
Alterations in state–local relations are naturally aected by federal policy changes. From
approximately 1960 to 1980 the national government engaged in an unprecedented
outpouring of financial aid to states and localities, primarily targeted toward physical
infrastructure projects to reverse the deterioration of many metropolitan areas, improve the
nation’s transportation network, and protect the environment. This period oederal fiscal
expansiveness was also marked by the beginnings of national subsidization of social
services that had been funded principally by state and local governments. These latter
actions were part of the larger eort to end racial and gender discrimination, uplift the
poor, and insure health care for the elderly and the disabled. One of the fundamental
consequences of the national government moving to finance social services was that in
a very few years aid to persons began to exceed aid to places, and this trend has not been
reversed since (Kincaid 1999). Federal aid as a percentage of state/local outlays reached its
peak in 1978 and began a downward slide, so although ‘‘in 1980 federal grants-in-aid
accounted for 26.5 percent of spending by states and localities, in 1987 it was 19.1 percent
. . . [that is] federal dollars spent on grants-in-aid for ‘governing’ functions declined 34
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percent in real terms between 1980 and 1987’’ (Gleason 1988, 10). Cuciti (1990, 235–50)
estimates that federal aid to urban places declined by 47 percent from 1980 to 1987, while
all other federal grants and transfers grew by 47 percent.
This swift turnaround signaled the end of expanding federal aid to states and localities
and confirmed the movement toward devolution that had begun in the late 1960s.
Beginning with the use of block grants and the Nixon administration’s policy to transfer
some functions back to the states and to return more program implementation
responsibility to states and localities, the movement away from program control by
Washington gathered speed. Deregulatory initiatives during the Carter administration were
followed by the Reagan administration’s rejection of (1) the reliance on national dollars by
the New Deal and the Great Society to foster change and (2) a role for the national
government in most domestic functions (Krane 1990, 108).
Much of the intellectual and philosophical impetus behind devolution rests on the
utopian quest for balancing up functions with the federal divisions of American
government (Nathan and Doolittle 1987, 6). Debate among scholars over just how much
devolution has occurred continues (see, for example, Dilger 2000), but it is clear that ‘‘the
intent of devolution is to enhance the responsiveness and efficiency of the federal system
based on the theory that state and local governments can do a better job of providing
services for citizens’’ (Watson and Gold 1997, 1). It is equally clear that ‘‘federal assistance
to cities is much diminished since the late 1970s’’ and ‘‘a much smaller portion oederal
aid is devoted to urban programs than was true just a decade and a half ago’’ (Eisinger
1998, 310–11). By 2000, federal aid to local governments constituted only 3.7 percent of
total general revenues (Bureau of the Census 2001). The product of the devolutionary shift
to the states of a larger share of the fiscal and administrative responsibility for social
assistance programs is a condition best labeled by John Shannon, who termed it ‘‘fend-for-
yourselederalism’’ (1987, 34).
While federal dollars to states and localities grew proportionally smaller, federal
conditions on aid and unfunded federal mandates continued to grow larger. The realities of
‘‘fend-for-yourselederalism’’ forced state governments to engage in their own
devolutionary actions and push program responsibility to local governments (Walters
1996). Watson and Gold determined that devolution from state to local governments began
in the mid-1980s: ‘‘This devolution is reflected in the relatively slow growth of state
financial aid to local governments, which is one of the reasons local taxes have been rising
faster than state taxes almost continuously since 1985’’ (1997, 2). They also stated that this
period can be characterized ‘‘as de facto devolution because most of the changes occurred
implicitly, as states assigned a low priority to helping local governments because of state
budget pressures and became more willing to allow localities to handle their own problems
without state interference’’ (1997, 2). This ‘‘second-order’’ devolution, according to the
National League of Cities, has meant that ‘‘transfers of program responsibilities from state
and federal government, as well as the imposition of state and federal mandates, increase
the roles and responsibilities of municipal governments, often without corresponding fiscal
capacity or authority’’ (2003).
Vertical Fiscal Relations
The revenue side of the ledger is politically more interesting because it has become the
fiercest policy battleground of state–local relations. Beginning in the mid-1950s state
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governments experienced a significant increase in ‘‘own-source’’ revenue as a proportion
of total revenues, such that state own-source revenues ‘‘vastly outpace[d] federal
contributions to average state revenues’’ (Weber and Brace 1999, 5). This revenue growth
allowed states to increase aid to localities for over two decades, but this aid peaked in 1980
and began to decline (Brizius 1989, 61). Although state aid to local governments in dollar
amounts continued to increase from $83 billion in 1980 to $288 billion in 2000, as
a proportion of total state spending it decreased from approximately 33 percent in the late
1970s to approximately 24.3 percent in 2000 (Berman 1998, 68; Bureau of the Census
2001). The result was that state aid to local governments did not keep pace with the
functional responsibilities state governments had devolved to local governments (McCue
1993). State aid to local governments equaled $195.8 billion in 1991 and constituted 29.9
percent oocal government spending (Bureau of the Census 1992). Although the dollar
amount of state aid to local governments increased to $288.3 billion in 2000, it dropped to
26.9 percent oocal government spending (Bureau of the Census 2001). Expressed
dierently, state aid to local governments through the 1990s increased by $92.5 billion,
or 47.2 percent, but this increase did not match the $415 billion, or 63.3 percent, increase
in local government spending. The unpleasant result for local officials was a double
whammy—not only had federal aid essentially dried up, but state aid also was eroding. If
local governments are the ‘‘workhorses’’ of American federalism, then ‘‘second-order’’
devolution piled more work on the horse but gave it less to eat.
DEVOLUTION AND THEORIES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM
The changes in state–local relations reviewed briefly in the previous section produced
a situation that ‘‘involves operating in an increasingly resource-constrained environment in
which national government transfers are being reduced, state responsibilities are
increasing, and the political costs of state tax increases appear to be high’’ (Weber and
Brace 1999, 11). But how would states and localities respond to this situation given that
their options were limited and unpalatable? How would state–local relations, especially
fiscal relations, change? If there is one component of the literature on federalism that is
theoretically developed and has been subjected to analytic tests, it is fiscal federalism
(Krane 1998, 871). Do the predictions of this body of theory and research address the types
of fiscal change that occurred as a consequence of devolution such as the changes in tax
assignment one might expect as a result of ‘‘second-order’’ devolution? In particular, does
the compass of fiscal federalism point to a preferred revenue option for municipal officials
as they attempt to navigate the sea changes of devolution?
Musgrave’s Principles of Functional Assignment
A natural starting point for any discussion of fiscal relations among governments is Richard
Musgrave’s recommended division of fiscal functions, wherein he stated: ‘‘The heart of
fiscal federalism thus lies in the proposition that the policies of the Allocation Branch
should be permitted to dier between states, depending on the preferences of their citi-
zens. The objectives of the Distribution and Stabilization Branches, however, require
primary responsibility at the central level’ (1959, 179–83, quoted in Oates 1994, 128). Mus-
grave proposed four basic principles for tax assignment: (1) highly progressive taxes, espe-
cially for redistributional purposes, should be centralized; (2) in general, lower-level
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governments should eschew taxes (at least nonbenefit taxes) on highly mobile tax bases;
(3) the central government should exercise primary taxing authority over those tax bases
that are distributed across jurisdictions in a highly unequal fashion; and (4) although user
taxes and fees have much to commend them at all levels of government as benefit taxes,
they are an especially appealing revenue instrument at the most decentralized levels of
government (Oates 1994, 131).
Though research generally confirms Musgrave’s ideas about stabilization and
redistribution, the existing research is much less clear about his principles for the allocation
ounctions of government and, in particular, the vertical structure of revenue systems.
Central governments in many countries, as expected, are the prime users oncome taxes,
and local governments around the world have historically relied on property taxes. But
considerable variation exists, and there is not a direct congruence between Musgrave’s
normative prescription and empirical realities (see Bahl 1994). Just to note the U.S. case,
local government adoption and use oncome taxes go back to 1938; today thirteen states
now permit local governments to tax income, and, as a proportion oocal government
revenues, income taxes have slowly but steadily grown and show every indication of
steady future increases. Research by Goodspeed (1989) finds that local governments can
use income taxes with only small losses of efficiency, thus contradicting Musgrave’s
prescription. One reason for this small loss of efficiency is simply that local governments
typically rely on state governments to collect income (and sales) taxes for them.
Tiebout Hypothesis and the Theory of Competitive Federalism
Perhaps the most widely known and cited description of allocation decisions made by
decentralized governments is Charles Tiebout’s 1956 model onterlocal competition.
Using the assumption that municipal officials compete for citizens and the taxes they pay
by manipulating the level, mix, and quality of public goods and services oered by the
jurisdiction, Tiebout argued that citizens ‘‘shop’’ among cities for a preferred combination
of public goods and taxes. Tiebout argued that, just as citizens exercise mobility to shop for
private goods and services, they would also shop for public ones. ‘‘Shopping’’ among cities
is possible if citizens possess spatial mobility and numerous local governments exist. If
taxes reflect the marginal cost of city services, then according to Tiebout the outcome
could be as efficient as private sector allocation. Because citizens can ‘‘vote with their
feet,’’ Tiebout believed that local officials would keep taxes as low as possible while still
oering attractive city services.
Tiebout’s market model oocal governments did not address vertical intergovern-
mental relations, but Paul Peterson did in his influential bookCity Limits (1981), where he
proposed a new theory ofcompetitive federalismbuilt explicitly from Tiebout’s ideas. A
full treatment of Peterson would require several pages; it is sufficient here to note a few
important propositions from Peterson’s model. He assumed that local officials approach
decisions about budgeting with a strategic eye toward the economic interests of the city and
rely on a benefit/cost calculus. In doing so, city officials consider a taxpayer’s proportional
contribution to the local budget as well as the direct and indirect incidence of any taxes
they levy. Therefore, ‘‘in order to protect the economic well-being of the community, the
government must maximize the benefit/tax ratio for the above average taxpayer’’ (Peterson
1981, 71). Or more simply, the competitive market among local governments creates
pressures pushing cities toward allocation policies and away from redistributive policies.
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From an intergovernmental perspective, Peterson (1981, 82) considered this local calculus
as an explanation for vertical cooperation on developmental policies (i.e., fostering
economic growth) and vertical conflict over redistributive programs. Thus, he arrived at the
same recommendation for a functional assignment of responsibilities that Musgrave did.
A key element in Peterson’s model is the relationship between taxpayers and officials,
and as part of that discussion, Peterson (1981, 74) oered some important statements about
local revenues. First, he noted that the local property tax is important as the significant
source oocal revenues. Next, he briefly reviewed the usual criticism of the property tax
that it (1) is income inelastic, (2) is a surcharge on a particular type of economic good, and
(3) burdens low-income groups disproportionally. He then critiqued the countercriticism of
those analysts who defend the property tax and concluded by noting that, this debate
notwithstanding, ‘‘local governments continue to prefer it over the income or sales tax,
simply because it is a tax on those products least equipped to escape its application’’ (1981,
74). Peterson (1981, 72–74) argued that the disadvantages of other revenue sources to local
governments strengthened the relative reliance on the property tax because (a) local user
charges are limited to the cost of the service provided and are not subsidized by federal tax
policy, (b) sales taxes encourage residents to purchase products outside of the jurisdiction,
(c) taxes on profits earned in the locality provoke businesses to move elsewhere, and
(d) local income taxes prompt residents to seek employment elsewhere.
Other scholars, principally in political science, havemodified both the original Tiebout
hypothesis and Peterson’s theory of competitive federalism. An important example is
Schneider, who analyzed the political economy of suburban municipalities and found that
although ‘‘growth in local property wealth is inversely related to the local tax bill
. . . redistributive social expenditures donotdeter the accumulationoocal propertywealth’’
(1989, 172). This result runs counter to Peterson’s theory, and Schneider argues that the
distribution of wealth in a community is highly stable and that ‘‘local fiscal and budgetary
policies do not much improve a community’s welfare’’ (1989, 173). Another critical finding
in Schneider’s work is that ‘‘variation in tax price was more consistently related to smaller
government than was variation in expenditures’’ (1989, 204). Put another way, the package
of public services provided by local governments is relatively more standardized across
localities than the tax bill is. After all, most cities have to oer the same but diverse set of
‘‘housekeeping’’ functions;whatwill vary is the quality of the services and thus the tax price.
Schneider also provides an important analysis ontergovernmental aid and notes that it is
driven by forces largely outside oocal governments and that, given the decline occurring
during the period of his analysis, aid ‘‘may ultimately produce even tighter limits on local
budgets and local policy’’ (1989, 195).
Although the competitive theory oederalism has exercised substantial influence on
the study oocal governments and intergovernmental relations, its explanatory reputation
is greater than its empirical foundation. Several studies (Basolo and Huang 2001;
Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994; Rusk 1995; Smith and Smyth 1996) have found various
flaws in the Tiebout model and its application to local government behavior, but perhaps
the most serious empirical refutation is Stein’s (1987) research using over 11,000 cities in
224 metropolitan areas. Testing the Tiebout view that cities will exhibit dierentiated
market baskets of goods and services, Stein discovered little dierentiation and a high
degree of homogeneity in service packages from city to city. Schneider’s work also
produced the same result. In other research Stein (1990) oered evidence that local
governments also pursue redistributive policies, contrary to the city limits thesis. He also
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suggested that cities act in ways that appear to be at odds with their economic interests by
adopting institutional strategies such as contracting out to constrain inefficiencies
reputedly associated with redistributive policies.
As important as this debate over local services is, it does not address questions related
to revenues. However, by inference one can extract a few propositions directly related to
local government revenue decisions. Citizens in a Tiebout market of competitive
communities ‘‘shop’’ for a basket of goods and services that comes with a tax price. The
research around the city limits model indicates that city services are relatively
homogeneous, but there is some evidence that tax bills vary. The obvious explanation is
that of quality of service, but Stein (1987, 155–56) discounts this explanation, as do studies
of citizen satisfaction with community services (see, for example, Lowery and Lyons 1989;
Lyons and Lowery 1989). Even more damning is Stein’s observation that, among other
plausible factors, race appears to be the only variable accounting for dierentiation among
community service packages. This finding is supported by other studies (Logan and
Schneider 1984; Miller 1981; Weiher 1991).
The ‘‘credit claiming–blame avoidance’’ practices of elected officials (Donovan 2001)
oer a possible explanation for service similarity and revenue dierentiation across local
jurisdictions. Simple electoral incentives push officials to tout the quality of services and
the (relatively) low tax price of their city’s services. Citizens are hard-pressed to judge the
validity of service quality claims (so are scholars) and typically possess little knowledge
about services in other communities (Lowery, Lyons, De Hoog 1990; Ostrom, Bish,
and Ostrom 1988, 90–97). However, citizens are more likely to be sensitive to variations
in their tax bill. Consequently, elected officials have incentives to adopt less visible
revenue sources—this behavior has been long noted in public finance literature (Ulbrich
2003, 190–91). Furthermore, the relative ease by which citizens can make comparisons
among local governments on the price they pay for services compared with the quality
they receive sharpens their focus on taxes.
Still, this line of theorizing oers little in the way of prediction as to what might
happen to local revenues as a result of devolution. The most direct hypothesis would be that
as local service demands increased because of devolution, local officials would seek to
engage in one or more strategies: (a) transfer the costs upward, (b) export the costs, (c) seek
revenues from superior levels of government, or (d) adopt (or seek permission to adopt)
less visible sources of revenues.
The Motivation for Devolution—Slaying the Leviathan
President Reagan’s strategy to devolve public activities from the national to state and local
governments was motivated, in a large part, by his ‘‘long-time dream. . . [of] balancing up
the divisions of government’’ (Nathan and Doolittle 1987, 6; see Conlan 1986, 15), and he
tried ‘‘in a single stroke . . . [to accomplish] a realignment that will end cumbersome
administration and spiraling costs at the Federal level’’ (Reagan 1982). In many respects,
Reagan viewed the national government as it were theLeviathan, a ruler or government
that systematically seeks to maximize budgetary resources, even over the opposition of the
citizens. Devolution was the sword by which he could slay the beast (Krane 1990). His
critics may have decried the social consequences of his political strategy, but as an
economic policy, it shared a similarity odeas with a public finance model developed by
Brennan and Buchanan (1984).
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In seeking a model of fiscal decision making that could inform the constitutional-stage
choices of fiscal instruments, Brennan and Buchanan argued that a democratically
constrained model of government would be ‘‘naive,’’ and therefore, they proposed a model
of government ‘‘in which the political-bureaucratic process, as predicted to operate post-
constitutionally, involves the maximization of revenues within the tax constraints imposed
in the fiscal constitution’’ (1984, 73). Calling their model Leviathan, they assumed that
‘‘citizens had no eective control over government, once established, beyond the
constraints that are imposed at the constitutional level.. . [P]ost-constitutional decisions
are made entirely by the budget-maximizing or revenue-maximizing politician-
bureaucrat’’ (1984, 73). The only means by which citizens could protect themselves from
Leviathan was to write into the constitution institutional devices to limit the revenue-
raising potential of rulers. Among the devices Brennan and Buchanan recommended were
constitutional limits on tax rates and tax bases, some degree of progressiveness in rate
structures, and decentralization. This latter device, they claimed, would take advantage of
‘‘interjurisdictional mobility of persons in pursuit of ‘fiscal gains’’’ (quoted in Oates 1994,
147). Thus, devolution was viewed as a strategy to reduce the size of government or, at
a minimum, to limit its ability to raise revenue. In an important comment, Brennan and
Buchanan warned that ‘‘we should, however, recognize that errors can be made in the
opposite direction, that the constitutional constraints might, through time, prove to be
overly restrictive’’ (1984, 84). Although they feared the Leviathan, they also exhibited
some concern about excessive restrictions on public sector revenues such that necessary
goods and services are not provided. Brennan and Buchanan, at this point in their logic,
found themselves in a dilemma caught between the desire to restrain revenue-maximizing
officials and their fear of a resource-strapped public sector that cannot adequately perform
required functions. They attempted to escape this predicament by suggesting that their
results ‘‘depend critically on the assumed predictions about the properties of the political
process [n.b.: they do not define or explain the ‘political process’]’’ (1984, 85). Brennan
and Buchanan (1984, 86) suggested that tax comprehensiveness is likely to be rejected
under certain political assumptions, and they claimed that their model helps one understand
the ‘‘attitudes’’ of taxpayers, who ‘‘are likely to react negatively and emphatically to
proposals to move toward taxation on the basis oull income’’ or who ‘‘would rejectany
widening of the tax base’’ (1984, 85).
Quite simply, the Leviathan model is congruent with the basic Tiebout logic as
a mechanism by which to constrain taxes. In addition to the already mentioned studies that
oer contradictory evidence to Tiebout’s model, research on fiscal decentralization does
not support Brennan and Buchanan’s hypothesis that smaller government would result
from devolution (Heil 1991; Krane 1973; Oates 1985). Consequently, devolution as
a strategy to reduce the size of government or to limit its ability to raise revenue was not
a policy that could produce the results sought by the Reagan administration.
Unresolved Debates about the Property Tax
Because Peterson claimed the benefit/cost calculus conducted by city officials included
a concern for tax incidence, it is necessary to review briefly the studies of property tax
incidence. Work on this topic is characterized by two competing conceptions of the
property tax—the benefit model and the ‘‘new view.’’ Each conception has its proponents
and opponents, and although the debate between the two sides remains unresolved, the
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disagreements do oer some ideas as to how local government officials might respond to
devolution.
The ‘‘benefit view’’ of the property tax is the older of the two conceptions, and it is
a modified extension of the Tiebout model. Instead of Tiebout’s head tax, the residential
property tax is seen tobe the key source of revenue for local governments, and strict zoning is
added to incorporate homeowners’ pressure on local officials to make land policy decisions
that protect the value of their principal asset—their home. Furthermore, because ‘‘capitali-
zation is everywhere,’’ the property tax serves to assign tax liabilities in line with the public
service benefits received, and thus it becomes a ‘‘benefit tax’’ (Fishel 2001b, 33–50).
By contrast, the ‘‘new view’’ of property taxes builds from a model of the general
national economy and sees housing as one type of capital stock within a larger capital
market. As such, housing capital is mobile and can be converted to other uses in the long
run. Therefore, local property taxes are, in eect, an excise tax on capital (Zodrow 2001,
80–85). As a tax on capital it discourages building relative to other capital investment and
thus distorts local housing markets and local fiscal decisions (Oates 2001, 22). For
example, iocal governments are restricted by state government to the use of property
taxes, then low levels of public services are likely to result.
After nearly thirty years of debate, ‘‘neither side therefore,’’ Nechyba concludes, ‘‘can
demonstrate a history of empirical work that rejects one view in favor of the other’’ (2001,
119). Oates is more blunt when he says: ‘‘I know of no systematic evidence on this matter
[the choice between the two views on the property tax]’’ (1994, 146). Nechyba puts the
responsibility for ambivalent results on the nature of the data when he says that ‘‘the main
piece of empirical evidence in favor of the benefit view is anecdotal’’ (2001, 119). As for
the behavior oocal officials, the research on the property tax has produced a similar
result: there is no clear evidence from either of these models as to whether local
governments will under- or overproduce local public services. However, what we might
expect to find is that if the ‘‘benefit’’ model is operative, then local governments will
rely heavily on the property tax, despite the incentives not to do so as hypothesized by the
‘‘new view.’’
Fiscal Federalism—A Brief Summary
This review of theories of fiscal federalism does not produce clear directions about the
course oocal revenues within the current dynamics of state–local relations. One is left
with the unfortunate conclusion that theories of fiscal federalism have not done a very good
job in predicting and explaining the actions oocal governments. The problem appears to
be, in part, the normative nature of the Musgrave, Tiebout, and Brennan and Buchanan
theories. Another part of the problem stems from what has been left out. Stein tells us that
in the competitive model oederalism, ‘‘politics, at least at the subnational level, is
marginalized. . . . Politics in the form of public preference is not important to the formation
of most municipal public policies, at least not those associated with significant re-
distributive eects’’ (1999, 27).
It seems apparent that the response oocal governments to devolution will be shaped
by the macrotrends aecting state–local relations and by the institutional attributes oocal
government. Ladd and Yinger, in their extensive study of municipal fiscal health, conclude
that cities have a limited ability to help themselves because ‘‘economic, social, and
institutional factors that are largely outside the city’s control’’ aect a city’s fiscal health
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(1989, 291). They further claim that ‘‘poormanagement, corruption, or profligate spending’’
are not causes of this limited municipal fiscal ability (1989, 291). Ladd and Yinger suggest
that city officials, although their fiscal tools are limited, should continue to strive to make
decisions that maintain or improve public services, but this is only possible if state
government permits the use of a policy tool such as a local option sales tax. Their
prescription rests on the rules and structures that create the institutions oocal government.
An alternative theory of fiscal federalism should call attention to the crucial fact that
‘‘institutions matter’’ (March and Olsen, 1984). It is increasingly evident that models that
omit institutional features are incomplete: ‘‘Localgovernments, then, are bundles of
particular institutions—for example, the power to zone, the power to tax, and the power to
provide services’’ (Burns 1994, 8). After all, the ‘‘creatures of the state’’ theory of state–local
relations rests on the legal authority of state government to determine the institutional
features oocal government (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001). The response oocal
governments to trends in their larger environment will be shaped by their institutional
features. These institutional features determine what options are feasible for local
governments. In a pragmatic search for the option that best addresses the challenges they
face, local government officials will continue to negotiate with state government and try to
alter the institutional arrangements of state–local relations. This path of development is best
understood in a historical light for each of the fifty state systems (North 1990). Broad
normative theories that abstract from the structure oaws and institutional powers relevant
in each case are not likely to help us describe or predict developments in local revenues or
other features ontergovernmental relations. Instead of theories of what local governments
should do, what is ‘‘badly need[ed]’’ and what is called for by many theorists is empirical
evidence about what they have done (Oates 1994, 133). It is to an empirical profile of recent
and significant municipal government revenue trends that this essay now turns.
THE SHIFT IN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES
Unfortunately, normative theories of fiscal federalism are often presumed to possess
explanatory power; but, as noted in the previous section, evidence in support of particular
prescriptions is often thin at best. In a recent discussion of subnational taxation, Bird
observes: ‘‘The tax assignment that actually prevails in any country inevitably reflects
more the outcome of political bargaining in a particular historical situation than the
consistent application of normative principles’’ (1999, 9). Because political bargaining over
revenues is so contentious, existing bargains are not easily altered. McLure (2001, 359)
labels this situation the ‘‘tyranny of the status quo’’ and pointedly observes that the U.S.
state–local fiscal structure exhibits this ‘‘tyranny.’’ Evidence of a tyrannical ‘‘status quo’’
would be found in the lack of temporal change in the reliance on a given revenue source.
In this section we describe recent trends in the sources of municipal revenues and
examine the extent to which changes in municipal revenue sources conform to
prescriptions for tax assignment drawn from theories of fiscal federalism. Though a few
scholars have also explored some of this same ground (e.g., Fisher 1996; Stephens and
Wikstrom 2000), it is striking the extent to which numerous scholars continue to describe
state–local fiscal relations in a status quo fashion. For example, Miller claims that
‘‘comparing and contrasting sources oocal government revenues between 1982 and 1996
reveals a fairly stable picture’’ (2002, 12). Tannenwald states that ‘‘local own-source
revenues are even less diversified than those of the states.. . . [H]owever, since the property
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tax remains the backbone oocal revenue systems, forces eroding its long-term pro-
ductivity continue to worry local policymakers’’ (2002, 471).
Declining Importance of the Municipal Property Tax
Duncombe and Yinger assert that ‘‘the property tax, long the mainstay of the local tax
system, is a highly visible, and hence unpopular tax, at least for homeowners’’ (2001, 243).
Though the property tax continues to be highly visible and a flash point of state and local
politics, its status as the ‘‘mainstay’’ oocal government revenues is no longer assured.
Through the twentieth century, taxes as a proportion oocal government revenues
declined gradually from 82.4 percent in 1902 to 37.6 percent in 1999. The property tax as
proportion of total general revenues (including intergovernmental transfers) has dropped
more rapidly from about 73 percent in 1902 to about 27 percent in 1997 (American Council
on Intergovernmental Relations 1998; Bureau of the Census 2000).
The reduced status of property taxes can be seen more clearly in the declining
proportion of own-source municipal revenues. Property taxes constituted 42.7 percent of
municipal own-source revenues in 1977 but only 28.8 percent in 1997—a proportional
drop of nearly one-third. During this period only in Alabama did property taxes as a percent
of own-source revenues increase (1.41 percent). In the other forty-nine states this
percentage declined, ranging from a 1.19 percent reduction in New Hampshire to 44.4
percent in Idaho (Bureau of the Census 1977, 2000).
Intriguingly, but not unexpectedly, the reasons for the movement away from the
property tax remain a matter of some debate among public finance scholars. The most
commonly accepted thesis holds that the tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) movement
beginning in the 1970s transformed the vertical fiscal structure of state–local relations
(Joyce and Mullins 1991; Shedbegian 1999). By imposing structural constraints on local
government fiscal decisions, TELs reduced local discretion and autonomy and increased
centralization of state and local finances (Saxton, Hoene, and Erie 2002). In her study of tax
revolts, McCabe estimated that the imposition of assessment limits and tax rate limits on
‘‘cities’ reliance on the property tax dropped by an average of 5.6 percent, while holding
other variables constant’’ (2000, 216). Some scholars go so far as to argue that ‘‘we can no
longer characterize the property tax as alocally determinedrevenue source in many states;
rather, it resembles more a fiscal tool of the state government’’ (Sokolow 2000, 86).
Other researchers point to a substantial growth in state government aid to local units
as the obvious factor in the declining proportion oocal revenues represented by property
taxes. Fisher oers this evidence:
Between 1965 and 1991, total state payments to local governments rose by 1,216 percent.
Payments for educational purposes rose by a slightly higher 1,290 percent. In comparison,
local government own-source revenue rose by 950 percent and property tax revenue by
641 percent. Clearly, property tax revenue is growing less rapidly than the total own-source
revenues oocal government, but state payments to local governments are growing much
faster than local government own-source revenue. (1996, 203)
Fisher (1996, 208) bolsters his case by reminding others that property tax revolts are not
new and occur periodically and that since 1978 numerous proposed TELs have been
defeated at the polls.
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A third suggested cause of the movement away from the property tax is judicially
driven school finance reform initiated by the California state supreme court decision in
Serrano v. Priest (96 Cal.Rptr. 601 [1971]). Fishel states: ‘‘The spread of Serrano-like
court cases around the country has, I submit, contributed to a dissatisfaction with local
property taxation’’ (2001a, 98–99). Fishel also points out that theSerrano decision, as it
spread across the country, resulted in ‘‘almost completely centralized school financing and
soon thereafter local property taxes were capped by legislative action in response to local
dissatisfaction with them’’ (2001b, 64–65).1
Current research continues to yield evidence in support of each thesis and bolster our
point about the importance of historical development and institutional structure in any
explanation oocal revenue trends. By 1997, thirty-seven states had some form of
restriction on local property taxes (Mackey 1997), and the existing literature demonstrates
that reductions in property tax reliance occurred after a TEL was imposed. Sokolow (2000,
87), while lamenting the negative eects of TELs on local governments, observed that
much of the reduction in property tax reliance can be attributed to enlarged forms oederal
and state aid. SinceSerrano, constitutional challenges to school financing systems have
been brought in forty-three states, and by the early 1990s twenty-nine states had court-
ordered school finance reforms (Evans, Murray, and Schwab 2001). Even in the absence of
definitive comparative research, one can conclude with some assurance that all three of
these factors have contributed to the movement away from the property tax. However,
a newer line of research suggests that a fourth factor contributes to the movement away
from the property tax, and it is to that determinant we now turn.
Alternative Sources of Municipal Revenues
With increased restrictions on the property tax and declining intergovernmental aid to local
governments (as documented earlier), municipalities sought other sources of revenues.
Although much of the commentary as well as the research has focused on the limitations
imposed on local government finances, state governments in recent years have also granted
local governments a considerable amount of fiscal discretion. States have significantly
increased the variety of revenue sources municipal governments may tap, and local
officials have made more expansive use of traditional but underutilized sources. A list
would include not only sales taxes (general or selective), income taxes, and entertainment
and tourism taxes but also business, occupation, and professional fees; current charges
(user fees); franchise fees; gaming fees; licenses; and permits, as well as interest income,
municipal enterprises, rents and royalties, and utility funds (Krane 1999).
To illustrate, the number of states authorizing local use of sales taxes steadily increased
from one in 1950 to twelve in 1963, twenty-five in 1970, thirty-one in 1994, and thirty-three
in 1997 (Mackey 1997). Sales and gross receipts as a proportion of municipal own-source
revenues averaged 17.1 percent in 1997, but the range varied considerably from no local
sales taxes permitted in NewHampshire to Colorado, Oklahoma, and Alabama, where sales
taxes accounted for about 40 percent of municipal own-source revenues. In twelve states,
sales tax exceeds the property tax as a percentage of own-source revenues. Bartle notes that
1 Fishel is correct when he says there has been a significant shift toward state funding of public education.
In 1959 state funding for education accounted for 38.3 percent of state and local spending on education; in
2002–2003, the state percentage was 53.8 (National Education Association 2003; Wong 1999). However, it is fair
to say that Fishel overstates the degree of centralization.
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‘‘general sales taxes are used by cities inmore than half of the states, and are over 15 percent
of total revenue in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah’’ (2003, 27). The trend toward the sales tax
as a key component ofmunicipal purses ismost evident in larger cities: ‘‘Of the largest thirty-
eight cities, six (Albuquerque, Denver, Nashville, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, and Tucson)
derive more than 20 percent of their revenue from this tax’’ (Bartle 2003, 27).
Nonproperty taxes were not listed separately in the 1977 Census of Governments, but
in 1997 these taxes accounted for 30.4 percent of municipal own-source revenues. This
category includes excise taxes on a diverse set of products and services. It is important to
note that nonproperty taxes constitute, on average, a larger portion of municipal own-
source revenue than do property taxes (in 1997: 30.3–28.9 %). Likewise, current charges
as a proportion of municipal own-source revenues increased from 18.6 percent in 1977 to
26.6 percent in 1997—nearly equal to the percent accounted for by property taxes.
Miscellaneous revenues grew from 10.2 percent in 1977 to 14.1 percent in 1997. A simple
comparison of the combination of current charges and miscellaneous revenues (31.2
percent) to property taxes (28.8 percent) demonstrates the reduced status of municipal
property taxes by 1997. Current municipal charges during this period increased on average
by 8 percent, whereas property taxes decreased on average by nearly 14 percent: or a 32
percent decline in property taxes as a proportion of own-source revenues versus a 43
percent increase in current charges. These changes are neither gradual nor insignificant
(Bureau of the Census 1977, 2000).
Although Philadelphia levied the first local income tax in 1938 (Rogers and Temple
1996), the enactment of state statutes permitting local governments to collect a tax on
individual or corporate income is a relatively recent trend. More than a dozen states now
authorize a local income tax, and although the proportional size of this revenue stream is
not yet large (approximately 2.5 percent of total general revenue), for many of the
country’s most populous cities, income and earnings taxes account for about half of
the city’s revenues. Examples include Cleveland, Columbus, Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas
City, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Toledo (Bartle, Ebdon, and Krane 2003).
Where not too long ago the property tax was the ‘‘mainstay’’ of municipal revenues,
its current status is substantially reduced. In a dozen states charges and user fees are the
‘‘main’’ source of city revenues, in six states the primary source is the local sales tax,
state aid is the largest source in four states, and in one state business and commercial fees
make up the bulk of city revenues (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001). Municipalities in
almost half of the states garner more revenues from sources other than the property
tax. This movement away from the property tax invalidates the view still held by many
fiscal analysts cited above. Simply put, this is a sea change in municipal finances, and
these trends discredit the so-called tyranny of the status quo in tax assignment. Although
the causes of these changes are far too numerous to discuss here, our previous work
suggests that these changes are the result of a variety of pragmatic decisions by local
officials and their negotiations with state government authorities (Ebdon, Krane, and
Bartle 2001).
FISCAL THEORY AND DEVOLUTIONARY REALITY
As a policy strategy, devolution is the logical opposite of market theories of fiscal
federalism. The ideas put forward by Musgrave and Tiebout prescribe a distinct functional
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division oabor among tiers of government and a set of recommendations for the
appropriate assignment of revenue sources among governments. Musgrave’s recommen-
dations dictate that (1) highly progressive taxes should be centralized, (2) a revenue source
with a highly unequal distribution ots base ought to be used by the central government,
(3) taxes on mobile tax bases should not be used by lower-tier governments, and (4) user
taxes are especially appropriate for the lowest tiers of government. Competitive fiscal
federalism derived from Tiebout’s market model holds that local governments cannot
sustain redistributive programs and, therefore, that these programs should be assigned to
higher tiers of government, with corresponding revenue sources as well. Peterson, one of
the chief architects of competitive federalism, counsels that local governments should not
adopt sales or income taxes; rather, they should continue to rely on the property tax and to
limit user fees to the cost of services. Brennan and Buchanan’s Leviathan model
recommends decentralization to control revenue growth, but these authors also fear that
this recommendation could just as easily result in overly restrictive public service
provision. Research on the incidence of the property tax, after a quarter century, remains
trapped in ambivalent conclusions about the eects of the tax.
The profile of municipal government revenue trends presented here belies the advice
oered by theories of fiscal federalism. That municipalities rely on a mix of revenue
sources—current charges, business and occupational taxes, entertainment and tourism
taxes, property taxes, sales taxes—runs counter to Musgrave’s recommendations. Of his
four recommendations, only his prescription that user fees are especially appropriate for
lower levels of government is confirmed by the trends in municipal revenue sources. Even
Musgrave’s recommendation to centralize highly progressive taxes such as an income tax
is being ignored, as evidenced by the emerging use oocal income taxes. Likewise,
municipal revenue trends run counter to Peterson’s prescriptions, in particular his
opposition to local sales taxes. Where once there was a reasonably exclusive assignment of
a revenue source to a given level of government, trends over the past quarter century have
done away with this neat distinction. As a consequence, existing theories of fiscal
federalism provide little if any explanation for these changes in local revenue sources. Nor
does this body of theory oer any advice to local officials on how to respond to ‘‘second-
order’’ devolution. Imagine the fiscal stress of municipalities had the recommended
assignment of revenues sources been followed to the letter.
Many of the eorts to understand recent trends in municipal revenues have
concentrated on three factors: TELs, state aid, and judicial decisions on school finances.
Although these factors contribute to our understanding of this shift, the movement away
from the property tax predates two of these three factors. As McCabe’s research
demonstrates, ‘‘declining property tax reliance was underway before the tax revolt’s
official kick-on 1978, and the pre-tax revolt period showed a greater rate of decline in
property tax reliance than did the post tax revolt period’’ (2000, 220). Only the initial
judicial rulings on school financing were coterminous with the pre–tax revolt period, but
these court cases were not the sole cause of movement away from the property tax. The
obvious, but often overlooked, factor of citizen demand for services aected reliance on
the property tax. Population growth in the form of urbanization coupled with rising
incomes and the development of a service-based economy meant that local governments
could capture more elastic revenue sources (McCabe 2000, 219). Tannenwald explains that
‘‘the property tax in the United States has increasingly become a tax on realty (Youngman
1998)’’ (2002, 476), as municipalities have backed away from its application to the
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tangible personal property of businesses (Brunori 2001). The combination of growing
demand for municipal services and the decisions of municipal and state officials to reduce
taxes on tangible property, along with the opportunity presented by growing sales and
income tax bases, oered localities in many states the options to seek out new revenue
sources and exploit underused ones.
More recently, as the costs of Medicaid and corrections consumed more state
government funds, states reduced aid to localities, and this led states to ‘‘leave much of the
tax increasing to local governments’’ (Gold and Wallin 1999, 73). One would have
expected an increasing reliance on property taxes, but the tax and expenditure limitation
crusade closed o that option, thus the shift away from property taxes and toward
alternative sources of revenue by municipalities. Again, this pragmatic response is
consistent with our emphasis on the historical development onstitutional arrangements.
At approximately the same time of theSerrano-type decisions on school finances,
state governments experienced a prolonged and profound period onstitutional change,
the details of which have been well described elsewhere (Bowman and Kearney 1986;
Walker 1995). One little-noticed institutional change was the increase in local government
discretionary authority created by state governments. This increase in local government
discretion was not confined to legal or structural matters, often associated narrowly with
the concept of home rule. States granted municipalities expanded authority in functional
responsibilities, administrative procedures and systems, planning and economic de-
velopment, and expenditures and revenues (Cigler 1997; Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001).
‘‘Although state governments hold legal supremacy in fiscal aairs,’’ Krane explains that
‘‘the reality of actual practice is more complex and varied’’ (1999, 277). Stonecash, in
a comparative analysis of state–local fiscal relations, finds that ‘‘there is considerable
variation in the role of state government in state–local fiscal responsibilities, and in the
degree onterdependency between the two levels’’ (1998, 89). This fits with the emphasis
on the negotiated relationship between local and state governments. The wide interstate
variation in each of the principal revenue sources of municipal governments, noted in the
previous section, is evidence consistent with this view. A good example is the growth in the
use of the local option sales tax; here local residents or the city council have voted to adopt
this new revenue source. Another example oocal fiscal discretion can be found in the
enlarged array of financial instruments authorized for use by municipal governments,
including tax increment financing and other forms of abatement or exemption from
property taxes for purposes such as ‘‘brown field areas,’’ enterprise zones, and free ports
(Krane 1999).
What is noteworthy about this movement away from the property tax and toward
alternative revenue sources is the increase in fiscal discretion state governments have
granted and continue to grant to municipal officials. Much of the original impetus may well
have been a reaction by state legislators to the public’s view that the property tax is the
‘‘worst tax’’ (Fisher 1996). But today another driver of the growing municipal reliance on
nonproperty tax sources is the increasingly accepted view that revenue diversification is
equated with good financial management. The National Advisory Council on State and
Local Budgeting and the Government Finance Officers Association encourage a balance of
revenue sources (Dennis and Statler 2002, 2). Studies of diversification are just beginning,
and early results have found that revenue diversity does lead to higher tax eort, but it also
moderates instability (Pagano and Johnston 2000, 169–70; also see Suyderhoud 1994).
Revenue diversification and consequent fiscal balance may not possess the theoretical
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cachet accorded to the models of fiscal federalism reviewed here, but its growing reality
speaks volumes about its practical value in support of an institutionalist-based explanation
oocal government (Frederickson and Smith 2003).
A CONCLUDING NOTE
The disjuncture between the prevailing normative theories of fiscal federalism and the
changes in municipal revenue sources we have described should not lead researchers to
reject economic analyses of state–local relationships. Rather, the apparent mismatch
between the theory and the reality of municipal revenues suggests that we should follow
Douglass North’s advice to incorporate institutional features into our analyses because, as
he noted, ‘‘the traditional public choice literature is clearly not the whole story’’ (1990,
140). To emphasize institutional aspects ontergovernmental relations and local
governments is, of course, not new. After all, there is a long history of research into the
consequences of municipal reforms. More recent scholarship on local governance also
highlights the importance onstitutional analyses (for example, see Boschken 2002;
Clingermayer and Feiock 2001). What is required is the recognition that the theories of
state–local relations and oocal government behavior reviewed here are founded on
normative premises and have not explained recent developments in local fiscal policy. This
is in part because they ignore the lesson onstitutionalism—institutions create incentives
that in turn shape future institutional developments. Institutional structures matter because
they may facilitate or hinder the behavior of actors operating within the institutional
structure, and conversely, actors may alter institutional structures.
Robert Stein suggests that ‘‘there is increasing evidence that market explanations of
subnational politics and policy rely on institutional factors’’; this is so, he argues, because
‘‘rule and structures matter’’ and ‘‘the states, not the federal government, hold the key to
successful devolution oederal responsibilities to local government’’ (1999, 36–37). But
which are the rules and structures that ‘‘matter’’ in regard to devolution? Our view is that
the successful devolution of programmatic responsibility to local governments by state
and national governments will turn on the capacity oocal governments to implement and
support the devolved activities (Burgess 1975; Gargan 1997). ‘‘The capacity to take on
responsibilities,’’ Kodras notes, ‘‘is defined by the extent to which fiscal resources,
expertise, infrastructure, and political will exist, or can be cultivated within particular
localities’’ (2001, 185). Kodras continues by observing that devolution ‘‘opens new
regulatory spaces [i.e., opportunities] for local initiatives’’ (2001, 186). Local govern-
ments and their officials are not helpless in the face oarger economic and political
trends. They ‘can alter their governing capacity from conditions onsufficiency to
sufficiency by several means’’ (Gargan 1997, 518), among which are the rules and
structures of state–local revenue systems. Revenue diversification oers an important
example of change in the governing capacity of state and local governments.
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